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children would seem to be necessary. Allowing a child to make his own
decision is not a viable alternative where the religion and way of life of
a devout sect stand firmly against further formal education.
Quite obviously the majority opinion in Yoder did not consider the
rights of the children. A dissenting opinion in the Wisconsin Supreme
Court decision suggested that a guardian ad litem should have been
appointed to represent those interests,49 and the suggestion has merit.
The Supreme Court might well have ruled the same way had the chil-
dren been represented, especially since the rights of the two groups of
children are almost equally balanced." Nevertheless, because the case
was decided without accounting for this crucial aspect of the case, the
Court made its important ruling in a practical vacuum.5
W. KIMBALL GRIFFITH
Constitutional Law-Standards for the Right to Speedy Trial
The right to speedy trial, guaranteed by the Constitution,' has
seldom been dealt with by the United States Supreme Court. It was not
until 1967 with the case of Klopfer v. North Carolina2 that the right to
speedy trial was established as "fundamental" and applied to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Concur-
ring in Dickey v. Florida,3 Justice Brennan subsequently pointed out
that the Court had never attempted to set standards by which the right
to speedy trial is to be judged. In the recent case of Barker v. Wingo,4
the Supreme Court undertook the task of providing constitutional
guidelines to be used by both state and federal courts in assessing this
"49 Wis. 2d at 452 n.1, 182 N.W.2d at 549 n.l (Heffernan, J., dissenting).
50The rights of those who lose the two years of education seem to be more substantial to this
writer; even this small additional factor might warrant a different result.
s1See generally Dixon, Religions, Schools and the Open Society: A Socio-Constitutional Issue,
13 J. PUB. L. 267, 304 (1964).
'U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence.
2386 U.S. 213 (1967), noted in 46 N.C.L. REV. 387 (1968).
3398 U.S. 30, 39 (1970).
'92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972).
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important right. In Barker the Court refused to declare that the Consti-
tution required the trial of a criminal case within any specific time
limits5 and adopted instead an ad hoc balancing test.'
Willie Barker and his accomplice, Silas Manning, were indicted on
September 15, 1958, for the brutal murder of an elderly couple in Chris-
tian County, Kentucky. Although Barker's trial was set for October 21,
1958,7 the prosecution did not believe that Barker could be convicted
unless Manning testified against him. In order to preclude Manning
from successfully asserting his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination when called as a witness to testify against Barker, Ken-
tucky first sought to convict Manning in a separate trial.8 After five
trials Manning was finally convicted of the murder of one victim in
March 1962.1 Conviction for the murder of the other victim followed
with a sixth trial in December 1962.10
In June 1959 after having spent ten months in jail, Barker obtained
his release by posting a five thousand dollar bond, and he remained free
until he was ultimately brought to trial. The Commonwealth requested
and was granted eleven continuances in Barker's trial without objection
from the defendant. Barker finally moved to dismiss the indictment
after the Commonwealth asked for a twelfth continuance in February
1962."1 The court denied Barker's motion to dismiss the indictment and
granted the motion for the continuance.12 The thirteenth and fourteenth
continuances were subsequently granted without objection from Bar-
ker.
3
After the conviction of Manning in December 1962, the Common-
wealth moved to set Barker's trial for March 1963.1 The fifteenth and
sixteenth continuances were granted over Barker's objection due to the
illness of the chief investigating officer in the case.'- Finally, in October
1963, more than five years after his indictment, Willie Barker was
brought to trial. With Manning as the chief prosecution witness, he was




"Brief for Respondent at 2-3 & n.1, Barker v. Wingo, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972).
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Appeals affirmed the conviction."7
In 1970 Barker petitioned the federal district court for a writ of
habeas corpus. The court rejected the petition but granted Barker leave
to appeal in forma pauperis. The decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.' 8 The Supreme Court subsequently
granted Barker's petition for certiorari. 9
In affirming the conviction, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that
whether the right to speedy trial has been violated must be determined
on a case-by-case basis. The Court indicated that the following factors
should be considered: (1) the defendant's assertion of his right; (2) the
prejudice to the defendant; (3) the length of the delay; and (4) the reason
for the delay.20
In holding that the assertion by the accused21 of his right to a speedy
trial is only one factor to be considered, the Court has rejected the so-
called "demand-waiver doctrine," which requires an accused to demand
a speedy trial or waive his right thereto.22 The Court felt that the
"demand-waiver doctrine" was inconsistent with its holdings which have
refused to uphold waivers of other constitutionally protected rights on
the basis of acquiescent conduct by an accused.2Y For example, in
Boykin v. Alabama,4 the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant
because the record failed to show that his guilty plea was intelligently
and voluntarily made. The right to assistance of counsel as similarly
guaranteed in Carnley v. Cochran25 unless it were waived intelligently
and understandingly.2
6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
established specific time limits within which criminal defendants must
"Barker v. Commonwealth, 385 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1964).
18442 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir. 1971).
19404 U.S. 1037 (1972).
2192 S. Ct. at 2192.21in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), the Court held that the sixth amendment
right to speedy trial is applicable only after a person has in some way become an accused and that
those not yet accused are protected by the applicable statute of limitations.
2See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 398 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1080
(1969); United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958),
where the "demand-waiver doctrine" was applied.
2"We reject, therefore, the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever
waives his right." 92 S. Ct. at 2191.
24395 U.S. 238 (1969).
-369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962), "Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible."
28Bui cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), in which the defendant, through his disruptive




be brought to trial in the district courts of the Second Circuit. 27 Specific
time limits within which an accused must be brought to trial have also
been recommended by the American Bar Association 2 and are required
by statute in many states. Some state statutes require that the accused
be brought to trial within a specific number of days or months29 or court
terms. 0
Interestingly, in Barker the Court made no mention of its amend-
ment of rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in April
1972.31 This amendment, effective October 1, 1972, was promulgated
under the supervisory power of the Court and requires all federal district
courts to:
prepare a plan for the prompt disposition of criminal cases which shall
include rules relating to time limits within which procedures prior to
trial, the trial itself, and sentencing must take place, means of report-
ing the status of cases, and such other matters as are necessary or
proper to minimize delay and facilitate the prompt disposition of such
cases.3
2
In refusing to impose specific time limits as a constitutional re-
quirement in Barker, the Court concluded that to proclaim judicially
such limits would involve it in action more appropriate for the legislative
branch of the government. 3 The Court also referred to United States
"21) CIR. R. REGARDING PROMPT DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL CASES provides in part:
In all cases the government must be ready for trial within six months from the date of
the arrest, service of summons, detention, or the filing of a complaint or a formal charge
upon which the defendant is to be tried (other than a sealed indictment), whichever is
earliest. If the government is not ready for trial within such time, or within the periods
as extended by the district court for good cause under Rule 5, and if the defendant is
charged only with non-capital offenses, then, upon application of the defendant or upon
motion of the district court, after opportunity for argument, the charge shall be dis-
missed.
Rule 5 gives the periods of delay which are to be excluded in determining the six month period.
See Statement of the Circuit Council to Accompany Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt
Disposition of Criminal Cases, Appendix, 28 U.S.C.A. (1972 Supp.).
"'A BA, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
SPEEDY TRIAL §§ 2.1-.3 (1967).
29E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5(a) (Smith-Hurd 1970) (120 days from arrest); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 795.1-.2 (Supp. 1972) (30 days from date held to answer to indictment; 60 days
from indictment to trial).
30E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-21 (1966).
3'Reported, II CRIM. L. REP. 3009 (1972).
"Id. at 3014 (emphasis added).
"The Court stated: "But such a result would require this Court to engage in legislative or
rulemaking activity, rather than in the adjudicative process to which we should confine our efforts."
92 S. Ct. at 2188.
1972]
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v. EwelP4 where it warned of a deleterious effect upon the interests of
both the accused and society if a requirement of unreasonable speed
were imposed as a constitutional mandate upon the nation's trial
courts.35
The Court in Barker identified three interests of the accused that
should be assessed in determining prejudice: (1) prevention of oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (2) minimization of the anxiety and concern of
the accused; and (3) limitation of the possibility that the defense will be
impaired.36 After weighing these factors in the Barker case, the Court
found it "clear that the length of delay between arrest and trial-well
over five years-was extraordinary"3 but that there was no violation
of Barker's constitutional rights since the prejudice was minimal," and
most importantly, because Barker apparently did not want a speedy
trial.39
This holding seems to have relegated the right to speedy trial to a
level inferior to other sixth amendment rights. For instance, right to
counsel has been upheld even without a showing of actual prejudice.4
0
Similarly, denial of the right to confront witnesses is constitutional error
which lack of prejudice will not cure.4' In the principal case, the Court's
finding that there was only minimal prejudice to the defendant's interest
is at least questionable. It has been validly asserted "that memories
fade, evidence is lost, and the burden of anxiety upon any criminal
defendant increases with the passing of months and years."4 The rav-
ages of time might not be evident in the record of the case on appeal,
but there can be little doubt of their potentially grave prejudicial effect
on the defendant's case.
4 3
The right to speedy trial may be undergoing the same evolutionary
process as other sixth amendment rights. For example, in Duncan v.
Louisiana,4 the Court extended the sixth amendment right to trial by
31383 U.S. 116 (1965).
3"A requirement of unreasonable speed would have a deleterious effect both upon the rights
of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself." Id. at 120.
1192 S. Ct. at 2193.
"Id. at 2193-94.
3Id. at 2194.
3 Id. The Court felt Barker was counting on Manning being acquitted, and the state then
dropping the charges against him.
"0Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475 (1945). But cF. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970).
"Brookhart v. James, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
4United States v. Mann, 291 F. Supp. 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"See United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 203 (D. Md.), affd, 350 U.S. 857 (1955).
4'391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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jury in criminal cases to state actions. The Court held that only petty
offenses could be tried without a jury but did not draw a distinct line
between petty and serious offenses. 5 Faced, in the jury trial context,
with the same problem, as in the speedy trial context, of drawing a
distinct line between the constitutional and unconstitutional, the Court
declined to establish such restrictions at the first opportunity. Instead,
it watched developments as the lower courts struggled with its nonspe-
cific guidelines. Finally, pressed to supply a precise answer two years
later in Baldwin v. New York," the Court looked to a federal statute,
section one, chapter eighteen of the United States Code, and adopted,
as a constitutional standard for state as well as federal cases, its defini-
tion of a petty offense as one for which imprisonment is not authorized
for more than six months.47 Similarly, in Barker the Court may have
declined to set precise time limits in order to be able to evaluate the
action that will be taken by lower courts as they endeavor to apply the
broad standards adopted in Barker. In a future case where the defendant
claims that he has been denied the right to a speedy trial, the Court may
again look to federal law for guidance and adopt the time limits which
are being prepared pursuant to amended rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
Another sixth amendment right which has undergone an evolution-
ary process is the right to counsel. In Betts v. Brady,4" the Court found
that whether or not a defendant had been denied due process of law, for
want of counsel at his trial, depended on the totality of circumstances
to be determined on a case-by-case basis. In Gideon v. Wainwright,4"
the Court overruled Betts. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in
Gideon commented on the passing of the totality of circumstances rule.5
The Barker standards, which require a case-by-case approach similar to
the guidelines adopted in Betts and overruled in Gideon, could well meet
the same fate.
The balancing test adopted by the Court makes no provision for
society's interest in having those accused of criminal behavior brought
swiftly before the courts. Although recognized by the Court,51 this inter-
est was not reflected in the standards adopted. This conclusion is illus-
'11d. at 161-62.
46399 U.S. 66 (1970).
1 1d. at 71.
"316 U.S. 455 (1942).
49372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"Id. at 349.
1192 S. Ct. at 2186.
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trated by the facts of the Barker case, itself, in which a man accused of
a brutal murder was free on bail for over four years. Society's interest
is given greater emphasis in amended rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
52
In assessing the possible remedies which could be imposed where
the right to speedy trial has been violated, the Court found dismissal to
be the only possible alternative and called it "indeed a serious conse-
quence because it means that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious
crime will go free, without having been tried."53 The Court considered
dismissal to be more drastic action than the exclusion of illegal evidence
under the fourth amendment. 4 However, this conclusion does not seem
to consider the fact that many cases reversed under the exclusionary rule
are never retried because the prosecutor realizes that he cannot secure
a conviction without the excluded evidence. In those cases where the
defendant is not retried, the charges have, in effect, been dismissed.
The development of the right to a speedy trial continues to lag
behind other constitutional protections afforded to the criminal defen-
dant. The Supreme Court in Barker has taken a step toward full protec-
tion of this right, but until explicit time limits are established, a substan-
tial risk of violation of this important right will remain in our system
of criminal justice.
FRED C. THOMPSON, JR.
Environmental Law-Expanding the Definition of Public Trust Uses
Public concern for protecting the environment has recently been
manifested in efforts to preserve the coastal wetlands.' Public pressure
has resulted in the passage of comprehensive coastal zone management
acts in three states2 and a variety of less comprehensive measures in a
52FED. R. CRIM. P. 50(b), reported, I I CRim. L. REP. 3014-15, provides in part: "The district
plan shall include special provisions for the prompt disposition of any case in which it appears to
the court that there is reason to believe that the pretrial liberty of a particular defendant who is in
custody or released pursuant to Rule 46, poses a danger to himself, to any other person, or to the
community."
192 S. Ct. at 2188, see ABA, supra note 28, § 4.1.
119 2 S. Ct. at 2188.
'See E. BRADLEY & J. ARMSTRONG, A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF COASTAL ZON13 AND
SHORELAND MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (Univ. of Michigan Sea Grant
Technical Report No. 20, 1972).
2FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.011-.45 (Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 46-23-1 to -12
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